The challenge of stability: Mexico's pursuit of sound money by Jerry L. Jordan
Mexico needs a stable standard of
value. Indeed, no economy can achieve
its potential without a stable standard 
of value.
Mexico needs to experience another
extended period of sustained prosperity,
as it did in the 1960s. A necessary condi-
tion for prosperity is sound money. So
long as fears of exchange rate or banking
crises persist, no country can sustain a
period of rising standards of living.
There is no mystery about what condi-
tions will foster sustainable growth. The
experiences of the transition economies
of the former Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe have provided us with many val-
uable lessons. One of those lessons is that
a market economy requires a Hayekian
infrastructure. That is, there must first be
a foundation of enforceable property
rights, generally accepted accounting
principles, stable currency, and sound
financial intermediaries.
If public contracts are not honored and
private contracts are not enforced, mar-
kets are impaired. If title to property is
not certain, normal banking is not possi-
ble. If financial statements are not reli-
able, investment opportunities are
obscured.
n n   Sound Money
Changes in the money prices of goods
and assets convey information. If an
economy’s monetary unit is known to be
a stable standard of value, then changes
in money prices will accurately reflect
changes in the relative values of goods
and assets. That is, price fluctuations sig-
nal changes in the demand for, or supply
of, goods or assets. Resource utilization
then shifts toward more valued uses and
away from those less valued.
However, if changes in money prices are
contaminated by the changing purchas-
ing power of money, false signals are
sent to businesses and households. Bad
decisions are made, and resources are
misallocated. Standards of living fail to
rise at their potential rate. Nominal inter-
est rates respond to shifting expectations
about the future purchasing power of
money. Changes in real interest rates are
obscured. Again, resources are misallo-
cated. Saving and investment decisions
are affected, and growth is impaired.
Neither inflation nor deflation enhances
economic performance. Unanticipated
inflations and deflations induce redistri-
bution of wealth—especially between
debtors and creditors—but they leave
the average standard of living lower. 
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How can Mexico best achieve a stable
standard of value and, hence, sound
money? Jerry L. Jordan, President
and Chief Executive Officer of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland,
explored this question in his address
to the DUXX Graduate School of
Business Leadership at its Forum on
Public Policy in Monterrey, Mexico.
This Economic Commentary is
adapted from his remarks.A former Federal Reserve governor used
to say, “a place that tolerates inflation is
a place where no one tells the truth.” He
meant, of course, that true changes in the
relative values of things cannot be ob-
served when the purchasing power of
money is not stable.
The standard of value is stable—money
is sound—when people make decisions
in the expectation that all observed
changes in money prices are changes in
relative prices, and all observed changes
in interest rates are changes in real rates.
n n    The Challenge
There is no single best way to achieve
and maintain a stable standard of value.
Even the commodity-backed currencies
of the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies were subject to periodic inflations
or deflations—as when new gold or sil-
ver mines were discovered, or mines
were depleted.
The choice of monetary regime has im-
plications for fiscal policies; and that,
in turn, means political choices must be
made.
Under a true gold standard, a country’s
internally and externally held debt both
represent claims to its gold reserves.
This effectively limits the government’s
ability to engage in deficit spending. The
size of government is restrained by the
ability to raise taxes.
Under the gold exchange standard of the
Bretton Woods System,1 a country’s ex-
ternally held debt still represents a claim
on its gold holdings. The government’s
ability to engage in deficit spending is
constrained primarily by the willingness
of its residents to add to their holdings of
government bonds.
Under a pure fiat money system,2 such
as we have experienced since 1973, the
universal challenge has been to find
effective constraints on the growth of
government spending financed by the
issuance of new debt. In this fiscal envi-
ronment, achieving and sustaining stable
currencies has been a worldwide chal-
lenge for central banks.
This pursuit of sound money has fol-
lowed several paths. The gold exchange
standard, for example—with pegged
exchange rates in the post–World War II
period—helped war-torn countries es-
tablish the credibility of their new cur-
rencies and central banks.
After the demise of the Bretton Woods
System, a few countries—such as Aus-
tria and Holland—were successful in
providing relatively stable domestic cur-
rencies by adopting a credible hard peg
to a stable foreign standard of value,
such as the deutsche mark. A few coun-
tries—Switzerland, and later Canada
and New Zealand—were relatively suc-
cessful with floating exchange rates
despite their small, open economies.
At times in history, currency boards also
have been successful means of import-
ing stable standards of value. For coun-
tries with historically undisciplined
fiscal policies, currency boards have
proven an effective means of achieving 
a fiscal regime that enables a more dis-
ciplined monetary environment.
The recent creation of a new currency—
the euro—to replace the national cur-
rencies of 11 European nations is yet
another method of insulating monetary
authorities from fiscal authorities. A suc-
cessful, stable euro will require fiscal
reforms that might not have been possi-
ble in the political environments of the
individual member nations.
And recently,  “dollarization” has
emerged as still another approach to
importing a stable standard of value.
But, like all approaches, there are pros
and cons that must be carefully weighed
before a choice is made between alterna-
tive monetary regimes.
In principle, Mexico could acquire a
stable standard of value in several differ-
ent ways. Some of the necessary condi-
tions for success are common to all
approaches. However, the political diffi-
culty of achieving and maintaining these
essential conditions depends on histori-
cal, social, and political developments
that vary greatly from country to country.
The ability to achieve and maintain fiscal
discipline is a key condition for success.
Even communist governments eventu-
ally learned the lesson that what can be
distributed and consumed is limited, ulti-
mately, by what can actually be pro-
duced. But as we know, governments of
all types have had a tendency to promise
more than is likely to be produced. 
Two crucial developments that led to
monetary instability earlier in the twenti-
eth century were capital markets that per-
mitted greatly increased debt-financed
spending by governments and the spread
of fiat currencies issued by central banks.
Successful fiscal discipline has been
threatened, most recently, by the growth
in unfunded pension liabilities of govern-
ments with adverse demographic trends. 
In the early 1980s, this linkage between
the fiscal regime and the implications for
the monetary environments was labeled
the “dismal arithmetic of monetarism.”
This premise held that any country that
found it politically difficult to achieve
and maintain a disciplined fiscal policy
would ultimately resort to the unlegis-
lated tax of debasing the currency. In
such circumstances, what we call mone-
tary policy becomes a fiscal instrument
—a method of funding government.
This  “fiscal dominance ” hypothesis of
the early 1980s—in an environment of
large national debts and annual deficits
all over the world—led to forecasts of
high and rising inflation in both industri-
alized and developing countries.
Instead, determined pursuit of disciplined
monetary policy in many countries im-
posed constraints on fiscal authorities. In
the case of the euro, political decisions
were agreed to in international treaties to
achieve and maintain the balanced fiscal
policies necessary for a successful mone-
tary regime.The experience with currency boards
has been similar. Once a decision is
made to give monetary stability the
highest priority, constraints on spending
and taxing authorities are inevitable.
Residual uncertainties about the durabil-
ity of currency board arrangements stem
from uncertainties about the domestic
political will to maintain the fiscal disci-
pline crucial to continued success of the
currency board.
n n    Dollarization
In January 1999, following the devalua-
tion of the Brazilian real, Argentine
President Carlos Menem suggested dol-
larization as a possible means of solidi-
fying his country’s commitment to
sound money. Since 1991, Argentina has
operated a currency board,3 pegging the
peso one-for-one to the U.S. dollar and
backing its monetary base with dollars.
Under this arrangement, Argentina’s
central bank has been remarkably suc-
cessful at fostering price stability in that
country, thereby satisfying a necessary
condition for sustained, long-term eco-
nomic growth consistent with Argen-
tina’s potential. Nevertheless, foreign
developments—such as the crises in
Mexico, Asia, and Brazil—have raised
questions about Argentina’s political
resolve to maintain a U.S. dollar stan-
dard of value. 
President Menem’s words have been
echoed throughout Latin America,
where dollars already circulate widely,
but the cry is loudest in Mexico. Sup-
porters see dollarization as a way to per-
manently protect Mexico’s growth and
prosperity from devastating, periodic
bouts of inflation and peso depreciation. 
Like all monetary arrangements, dollar-
ization would impose certain constraints
on political authorities. Public trust ulti-
mately depends on reputations. Con-
straints on policy discretion are valuable,
because they buy time in which to build
these reputations. These constraints
involve both costs and benefits that
countries must consider on a case-by-
case basis. I do not give policy advice on
the issue of dollarization, because not
everyone gains, or gains equally, from
the choice of one monetary regime ver-
sus another.
n n    Why Sound Money Matters
Money serves to lower the real eco-
nomic costs of engaging in economic
exchange, but its effectiveness in doing
so hinges on the stability of its purchas-
ing power. If people suspect that a mon-
etary asset will lose its purchasing
power, they will reduce their holdings of
it, look for substitute monetary assets
(dollarize), and devise alternative—and
less efficient—methods of exchange.
When this happens, the costs of under-
taking daily transactions rise as the pub-
lic diverts real economic resources away
from alternative and more productive
uses. Resources are wasted. By conserv-
ing these economic resources, stable
monetary institutions promote allocative
efficiency and economic growth. 
Although governments generally under-
stand the benefits of stable money, they
also have strong incentives to generate
unanticipated inflation. This is espe-
cially true of politically weak govern-
ments, who attach a low probability to a
long tenure and, therefore, heavily dis-
count the more distant gains of eco-
nomic growth. Through expansions of
the money supply, governments can
gain seigniorage and levy an inflation
tax—without the consent of the public
as expressed through a legislative pro-
cess. In addition, through unanticipated
inflations, governments are sometimes
tempted to try to exploit a short-term
trade-off between employment and
inflation.
Once caught off guard, however, the
public will become more wary in the
future. For their own protection, they
will reduce their holdings of domestic
money. The spontaneous dollarizations
in Argentina and Mexico in the early to
mid-1980s exemplify this response.
Some Latin American governments ini-
tially resisted these unofficial dollariza-
tions, but their responses to currency
substitutions (such as capital controls)
tended to compound the inefficiencies
associated with monetary instability. 
Faced with the public’s clear preference
for a stable currency, governments may
adopt institutional constraints on their
ability to inflate—like independent cen-
tral banks, exchange-rate pegs, or cur-
rency boards. All have been tried, some
have been successful, but most have
been abandoned when political circum-
stances changed. The small, but persis-
tent, spread between interest rates on
Argentine peso-denominated debt and
interest rates on dollar-denominated debt
reflects the slight probability that Ar-
gentina might break its dollar peg, or
alter the rules under which its currency
board operates.
Institutional constraints on monetary
policy—by themselves—do not di-
rectly address the fiscal-policy and bank-
ing-structure problems that often give
rise to monetary instability in emerging-
market countries. Moreover, they do not
erase the need to re-think the political
and societal infrastructure that restricts a
nation’s ability to develop and grow. 
Ultimately, the only way governments
can attain the optimal outcome to the fiat
money problem is by developing a repu-
tation for behaving in a responsible man-
ner. Switzerland, a small, open economy,
has achieved sustained economic growth
with reasonable price stability without
the aid of a currency board, the Euro-
pean Monetary Union, or pegging to
another currency. 
Although the integrity of a stable pur-
chasing power ultimately depends on
reputation, constraints on monetary pol-
icy discretion can enhance a govern-
ment’s standing—though they do so
only as a signal of intentions with regard
to other institutional reforms. Argen-
tina’s currency board has successfully
eliminated inflation while that country
adopted more general, market-based
economic reforms. Argentina’s intention
to develop the economic infrastructure
of a normal market economy has been
made clear. Monetary constraints alone,
however, would stand little chance in
countries like Russia that have made lit-
tle progress in establishing the Hayekian
infrastructure essential for markets and a
liberal democratic order.n n    Economic Adjustments 
Under a Common Currency
Regions, sectors, and industries do not
always prosper equally, even in a com-
mon currency area. Regional booms and
busts still occur. Some sectors or indus-
tries expand while others contract. This
kind of disparate economic performance
may have its origins in the domestic
economy or in developments in another
currency zone.
For the past couple of years, the U.S.
dollar has been relatively strong—
especially compared to currencies in
Asia and some in Latin America—and
overall, the U.S. economy is perform-
ing very well. Nevertheless, this pros-
perity is not universal. Steel companies
are losing money, declaring bankruptcy,
laying off workers, and shutting down
plants. I am certain that steel company
executives would like to see a weaker
dollar, especially relative to the Japan-
ese yen and other Asian currencies. The
story in textiles is similar.
The U.S. oil sector is also depressed, so
Alaska, Louisiana, and Texas are not
doing so well. Likewise, the Midwest
agricultural sector that depends heavily
on exports, or has to compete with
imports, is having a hard time. The
economy of Hawaii has been depressed
for several years as a result of the
decade-long recession in Japan.
All of these adverse economic condi-
tions create political pressures for gov-
ernment assistance. Sometimes the aid
comes in the form of subsidies, some-
times tax relief, sometimes protection
against competition from imports. Ulti-
mately, though, both labor and other
productive resources will leave these
depressed sectors and regions and mi-
grate to areas and industries where op-
portunities are more promising. The
greater the flexibility and efficiency 
of labor and capital markets, the better
the odds of resisting pressures for
political relief that come from adverse
developments.
The recent launch of the euro—a com-
mon currency to be shared by 11 Euro-
pean nations—provides an opportunity
to learn more about political responses
to the pressures arising from diverse
economic conditions. Whether a single,
uniform monetary policy can serve both
the booming economy of Ireland and
the stagnating economies of Germany
and Italy remains to be seen.
In addition to labor and capital markets,
the health of the banking industry influ-
ences a nation’s ability to adjust to
changing economic circumstances. Even
within a common currency area, a lack
of diversification of assets or funding
sources can create problems for banks
faced with regional or sectoral booms
and busts. During the oil-price collapse
of the 1980s, for instance, U.S. banks
that were tied exclusively to oil-region
economies failed or were acquired by
healthy banks in other regions. More
diversified Canadian banks all survived.
Nationwide branch banking in the U.S.
is not yet two years old, but there is no
question that greater diversification has
contributed to the soundness of the
larger regional and super-regional com-
panies. The U.S. found that maintaining
political boundaries to branch banking
in the common currency area of the 50
states was destabilizing. Under the cur-
rency board arrangement of the past
eight years, Argentina has seen the for-
eign ownership share of its banking sec-
tor grow to 50 percent. There is little
question that the continued success of
the currency board has been enhanced
by the financial stability attained by the
internationalization of banking.
For the banking system to remain
healthy, additional liquidity must be
readily available in times of heightened
uncertainty. When truly systemic events
occur—the public desires to hold more
currency because of century date
change uncertainties, or banks attempt
to hold more reserves against their
deposits during political crises—the
only source of additional currency or
reserves is the issuing central bank. This
classic “lender of last resort” function4
can be fulfilled only by the central bank
empowered to expand or contract its
balance sheet without limit. In a world
of fractional reserve requirements im-
posed on deposit liabilities, an elastic
source of central bank money is essen-
tial. However, that function need not be
provided domestically.
In the modern world, this so-called
lending function is typically performed
through open-market operations, with-
out any need for direct central bank
lending to local institutions. All that is
necessary is that the supply of central
bank money in the market expands as
demand increases. Moreover, subsidi-
aries or branches of foreign banks ef-
fectively diversify a country’s banking
system, making it less vulnerable to
economic disturbances. Because of
their close ties to the parent banks and
access to global financial markets, they
may be more able and willing than
local banks to maintain lending when
faced with deposit outflows. 
n n    Market Choice and Change
Permitted the choice, people prefer to
hold money that will offer the most sta-
ble purchasing power over time. When
countries impose capital restraints or
establish legal tender rules, they limit
their citizens’ ability to protect their
income and wealth from inflation.
Argentina clearly signaled its intention
to maintain monetary stability by grant-
ing people the legal right to contract un-
der any and all circumstances—includ-
ing tax payments and other transactions
with the government—in any currency
they might choose. Legislation in Argen-
tina requires courts to enforce contracts
in the currency specified therein. This
“specific performance” law5  provides
greater assurance that the effective dol-
larization will not be reversed.A dollarization process is already under
way—without official sanction—in
many Latin American countries. Permit-
ting parallel currencies would have
some of the benefits of officially sanc-
tioned dollarization, but would maintain
greater flexibility during the transition
process. In fiat money regimes, Gre-
sham’s law becomes inverted—high-
confidence monies drive out low-confi-
dence monies. The resulting discipline
from competing standards of value
strengthens the political resolve to
achieve the fiscal balance necessary for
monetary stability. 
A fundamental principle of a market
economy is consumer sovereignty. Peo-
ple will act in a manner that enhances
their own well-being. In the process—
as if guided by an invisible hand (to
quote a wise man)—they generally will
promote the best interests of society at
large. The spontaneous, informal dol-
larizations in many countries over
recent decades demonstrate that people
know that sound money serves their
personal interests. National interests
also are served by providing a stable
standard of value.
n n    Footnotes
1.  Under the Bretton Woods System, the dol-
lar was pegged in value to 1/35 of an ounce
in gold, and the currencies of the various
Allied nations (Great Britain, France, and
their allies) were pegged to the dollar.
2.  Money with little or no value in use rela-
tive to value in exchange. Modern paper cur-
rency, coins, and checkable deposits are
examples of fiat money; their value comes
from people’s willingness to accept them in
trade of goods.
3. Argentina does not have an orthodox cur-
rency board; rather, it established a currency
board-type arrangement, with related eco-
nomic reforms, in 1991 under the “converta-
bility” plan. Unlike traditional currency
boards, Argentina’s system has a central bank
and allows for some discretionary monetary
policy. See Steve H. Hanks and Kurt Schuler,
“A Dollarization Blueprint for Argentina,”
Cato Institute, Foreign Policy Briefing, March
12, 1999 (available at http://www.cato.org/
pubs/fpbriefs/foreignbriefs.html).
4. The expression “lender of last resort”
emerged when the primary method by which
central banks provided additional liquidity to
the banking system during banking panics
was by “rediscounting” commercial loans at
the discount window. The objective was to
reassure a nervous public that they could con-
vert deposit balances to currency if they so
desired. In recent decades, the discount win-
dow at the U.S. central bank has declined in
importance as a source of central bank funds.
Instead, open-market operations have become
the primary method of satisfying increased
public desires to add to their cash balances.
5. Specific performance legislation is not
the same thing as legal tender laws. The lat-
ter require residents of a country to accept a
certain currency in settlement of a financial
obligation, even if they are owed a foreign
currency, gold, or bales of hay. Specific per-
formance legislation means the courts must
require delivery of what was promised to
the contract, even if that is the currency of
another country, gold, or bales of hay.
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